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UNDERCOVER MARKETING: IF OMISSION IS THE
MISSION, WHERE IS THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION?
Brooke E. Crescenti*
INTRODUCTION
In 1915, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was organized
as an independent federal administrative agency pursuant to the
congressional mandate set forth in the Federal Trade Commission
Act of 1914 (FTC Act).1 The FTC is granted the authority to
investigate, prevent, and prosecute unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, including cases of false
advertising and unsubstantiated product claims.2 However, in spite
*
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1
15 U.S.C. § 41 (2003).
2
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1938). With regard to the administration and
enforcement of the FTC Act, if the FTC has reason to believe that a violation
has occurred of any of the proscriptions in the Act against unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce or unfair methods of competition in
and affecting commerce, it may issue a complaint setting forth the
Commission’s charges. Once the complaint is served on the individual or
business entity, the FTC will hold a hearing. Id. If, after the hearing, the FTC
believes that the individual or business entity indeed engaged in deceptive acts
or practices, it may issue a cease and desist order against the practice. Id. The
federal courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to FTC
cease and desist orders. Id. § 45(d). The findings of fact, if supported by
evidence, are conclusive on appeal. Id. § 45(c). Violations of final orders,
whether adjudged by the FTC or the courts of appeals, result in civil penalty
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of the FTC’s authority to investigate deceptive acts and its
requirement that advertisers disclose material connections between
product endorsers and the companies selling the endorsed
products,3 the FTC thus far has failed to scrutinize undercover
marketing, a growing, innovative, and unconventional form of
marketing communication.4
Undercover marketing is “a type of advertisement using actors
in real-life settings to make them appear to be average people.”5 It
utilizes “people hired by a company to surreptitiously promote a
product in public establishments.”6 In a typical undercover
marketing campaign, a marketer hires an actor to go into public
places and approach consumers with one objective in mind: to
pitch a product without revealing to consumers that they are the
subjects of a marketing campaign and that the actor is being paid to
promote a product.7 A successful undercover marketing operative
appears to be just another satisfied customer.8 The target consumer
believes that she is simply engaged in a spontaneous conversation
with an average Joe or Jane.9 Marketing firms believe that
actions, brought by the Attorney General, and mandatory injunctions. Id. § 45(l).
In addition, the FTC is granted rulemaking power to supplement the FTC Act in
order to curb deceptive practices or unfair competition occurring on an industrywide basis. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1914).
3
Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0-255.5 (1980) [hereinafter FTC Guides].
4
As of Apr. 19, 2005, all articles and sources cited in and researched in
preparation for this note failed to report any FTC proceedings against
undercover marketers.
5
Undercover Marketing, WEBSTER’S NEW MILLENNIUM DICTIONARY OF
ENGLISH (2003), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=
undercover+marketing.
6
Id.
7
Walking, Talking Stealth Ads, THE JOURNAL RECORD, Sept. 12, 2002, at
2002 WL 4937133; 60 Minutes: Undercover Marketing Uncovered (CBS
television broadcast, July 25, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2003/10/23/60minutes/main579657.shtml.
8
The Evening Standard: If This Woman Offers You a Drink, Don’t Think
It’s Your Night (UK television broadcast, July 31, 2001) (noting that undercover
marketing operatives are not genuine, disinterested consumers, but rather, the
“secret agents of capitalism”).
9
Id.

BROOKE MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC

6/20/2005 7:11 PM

UNDERCOVER MARKETING AND THE FTC

701

undercover marketing works to capture the coveted 18- to 34-yearold demographic, which historically has been unmoved by
traditional print and broadcast advertising.10 Sam Ewen, CEO of
Interference, Inc., a major New York undercover marketing firm,
says of undercover marketing, “[W]e can target customers at those
times when they’re open to being talked to. It’s not as passive as
television or radio. That gives us an advantage.”11
FTC regulations, however, mandate that advertisers disclose
any “material connection” between a person endorsing a product
and the company selling the product.12 The FTC Guides
Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising
(FTC Guides) define a “material connection” as a relationship that
might affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement.13 This
note argues that undercover marketing is necessarily deceptive and
10

Vickie Maye, You’re Roach Bait to Marketing Spies, SUN HERALD, Aug.
19, 2001, at 42 (explaining that undercover marketers believe that going
undercover is the only way to reach consumers ages 12 to 34 who are “too savvy
to fall for traditional advertising methods”).
11
Ryan Naraine, Questions for Sam Ewen, CEO of Interference, Inc.,
atnewyork.com, July 25, 2001, at http://www.atnewyork.com/news/article.php
/8511_808381.
12
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5. The regulation states:
When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of
the advertised product which might materially affect the weight or
credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably
expected by the audience) such connection must be fully disclosed. An
example of a connection that is ordinarily expected by viewers and
need not be disclosed is the payment or promise of payment to an
endorser who is an expert or well known personality, as long as the
advertiser does not represent that the endorsement was given without
compensation. However, when the endorser is neither represented in
the advertisement as an expert nor is known to a significant portion of
the viewing public, then the advertiser should clearly and
conspicuously disclose either the payment or promise of compensation
prior to and in exchange for the endorsement or the fact that the
endorser knew or had reasons to know or to believe that if the
endorsement favors the advertised product some benefit, such as an
appearance on TV, would be extended to the endorser.
Id. (emphasis added).
13
Id.
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therefore violates FTC regulations because the principal goal of
any undercover marketing campaign is to assure that target
customers are unaware that they are being pitched to by interested
product marketers.14 Jonathan Ressler, the pioneer of undercover
marketing in the United States and the founder of Big Fat
Promotions, Inc., one of the most prominent undercover marketing
firms in New York,15 boasts, “You can never, ever tell we’re doing
it. And we’ll never admit to it. If people ever know they’re being
marketed to, we’re not doing our job properly.”16 Although the
FTC prohibits marketers from engaging in this type of conduct
without revealing to consumers the endorsers’ financial
connections to the company,17 in practice, the agency has declined
to bring enforcement actions against undercover marketers
engaged in deceptive practices, despite the statutory mandate
directing the FTC to prevent deceptive acts.18
Part I of this note explores the role of the FTC in regulating,
enforcing, and defining the parameters of permissible marketing
techniques. Part II argues that undercover marketing is a deceptive
practice subject to FTC jurisdiction and that the FTC should
investigate the practice in order to comply more fully with its
14

Brian Steinberg, Undercover Marketing Is Gaining Ground, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 18, 2000, at B17D (explaining that “the ploy has advertisers plant
seemingly average Joes in a demographically desirable crowd—without tipping
consumers off that the people touting the goods are hired to do so”).
15
JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF
PROFIT AND POWER 132 (2004) (explaining that Ressler is credited with the
invention of the undercover marketing technique).
16
Undercover Agencies, THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 27, 2001, at M03.
17
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5. See regulation text cited supra
note 12.
18
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) states that “[t]he Commission is hereby empowered
and directed to prevent persons, partnerships or corporations . . . from using . . .
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” (emphasis
added). Undercover marketing falls within this ambit because undercover
marketers do not disclose material connections between their companies and
their endorsers, as required by the FTC Guides. FTC Guides, supra note 3, at §
255.5 (commanding that “when there exists a connection between the endorser
and the seller of the advertised product which might materially affect the weight
or credibility of the endorsement [i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected
by the audience] such connection must be fully disclosed”).
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mandate to enforce the FTC Act. Part III discusses the striking
similarities between undercover marketing and infomercials,19
which have been heavily regulated by the FTC in recent years, and
argues that undercover marketing should command similar FTC
regulation. Finally, Part IV evaluates the potential consequences of
the FTC’s inaction with regard to undercover marketing practices,
including further tarnished corporate credibility and widespread
consumer distrust. This note concludes with a call for action by the
FTC.
I. THE FTC’S REGULATION OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
The FTC was initially established to enforce antitrust
regulations.20 Thus, the FTC’s current position as an advertising
and marketing enforcer was a “fortuitous by-product” of the terms
of the FTC Act.21 In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Federal
Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., construed the Act
to give the FTC the power to regulate deceptive advertising and
marketing affecting consumers.22 The Court remanded to the Fifth
Circuit a judgment setting aside the FTC’s cease-and-desist order
against Sperry & Hutchinson Co., a trading stamp company, for
violating federal antitrust law by suppressing customer trading
stamp exchanges.23 Finding that the FTC had inadequately linked
19

According to the FTC, infomercials are advertisements “presented in the
guise of a talk-show format.” FTC v. California Pacific Research, Inc., No. CVN-88-602BRT, 1991 WL 208470, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 1991). Similarly,
undercover marketing schemes are face-to-face marketing interactions with
customers presented in the guise of everyday conversations with averagelooking strangers. See, e.g., The Evening Standard, supra note 8.
20
15 U.S.C. § 41 (effective Sept. 26, 1914).
21
W.H. Ramsay Lewis, Infomercials, Deceptive Advertising and the
Federal Trade Commission, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 853, 854 (1992) (citing
EARL W. KITNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 56 (1978)).
While the FTC Act was originally intended to prevent instances of unfair
competition between companies, the FTC’s current regulatory scheme now
focuses on protecting consumers from marketing companies, in addition to
protecting companies from one another. Id.
22
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
23
Id. at 250.
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Sperry & Hutchinson Co.’s conduct to a violation of antitrust law,
the Court considered whether the FTC was limited to regulating
only those deceptive acts or practices that violate the spirit of the
antitrust laws, that is, only those practices that are unfair to
consumers and also affect competition, as the Fifth Circuit held.24
The Court held that the FTC has broad regulatory power to protect
both companies and consumers, noting that Congress, when
creating the statutory FTC powers, explicitly considered and
rejected the inclusion of a rigid list of unfair practices to be
regulated.25
The Federal Trade Commission’s authority to regulate
deceptive advertising and marketing is contained within Section 5
of the FTC Act (Section 5).26 Section 5 provides that unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in and affecting commerce are
unlawful.27 In Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture
Advertising Service Company, the Supreme Court noted the
generality of Section 5, explaining that the statute’s proscriptions
are flexible to permit their later definition “with particularity by the
myriad of cases from the field of business.”28 Further, in a
conference report, Congress explained that Section 5 is necessarily
24

Id. at 239, 248.
Id. at 239-240. Congress acknowledged that the potential for human
inventiveness in the field of consumer manufacturing made it unwise to strip the
FTC of regulatory discretion and latitude. Id.
26
As amended in 1938. Kathyleen A. O’Brien, Strategies for Successfully
Defending Against Federal Trade Commission Investigations of False and
Deceptive Advertising, 775 PLI/COMM 269 (1997) (explaining that while Section
12 of the Act relates specifically to false advertising concerning food, drugs,
devices, and cosmetics, Section 5 of the Act grants the FTC broad jurisdiction
over other types of deceptive acts and practices in and affecting commerce that
relate to the public interest).
27
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1938) (stating “[u]nfair methods of competition, in
and affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful”).
28
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394
(1953). The Court, after explaining that Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC
broad power to regulate and define unfair or deceptive acts and practices, held
that the FTC exercised proper discretion in finding that a film distributor’s
exclusive screening agreements with theater operators unfairly restrained
competition. Id. at 394-95.
25
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broad because there is “no limit to human inventiveness in this
field” and an attempt to pinpoint particular prohibited practices
would prove futile.29
The FTC has interpreted its expansive mandate to permit the
agency’s investigation into
(1) any acts, practices, conduct, or circumstances which the
Commission has been authorized by law to investigate; (2)
suspected violations of the laws and regulations enforced
by the Commission; (3) industry practices to determine
whether a trade regulation, rule, legislation, or other means
of corrective action would be appropriate; or (4) possible
violations of a Commission order to cease and desist.30
FTC investigations may take two forms: nonpublic or public.31
In a nonpublic investigation, the FTC keeps confidential the details
of its investigation of individuals or business entities to protect
against premature adverse publicity.32 Conversely, the FTC may
conduct public investigations of the practices of an entire industry
or group of industries when it feels that the interests of the public
will be best served by an open investigation.33 In either case, with
29

H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914). See also FTC v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (explaining that the generality of
Section 5 “necessarily gives the Commission an influential role in interpreting §
5 and in applying it to the facts of particular cases arising out of unprecedented
situations”).
30
FTC Operating Manual, ch. 3.1.2.1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
foia/adminstaffmanuals.htm.
31
Id. at ch. 3.3.3.1, 3.3.3.2.
32
Id. at ch. 3.3.3.1.
33
Id. at ch. 3.3.3.2. The FTC publicly announces open investigations
through news releases outlining the FTC’s charges against an individual or
company and the allegedly offending act or practice. The news release may
also provide a synopsis of prior FTC action against the individual or
company. Each release directs readers to the FTC’s webpage or a mailing
address to obtain a copy of the formal complaint. See, e.g., News Release,
Federal Trade Commission, Ads for Various Diet Supplements and Topical
Gels Don’t Cut the Fat, Says the FTC (June 16, 2004) (announcing the
FTC’s administrative complaint against Basic Research, L.L.C. and others
for making false and unsubstantiated claims about weight-loss and fat-loss
gels and supplements), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/
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the objective of compelling enforcement or corrective action, the
agency makes detailed inquiries into possible violations of the laws
and regulations it enforces.34
Enforcement mechanisms and other corrective measures
employed by the FTC include injunctions, investigational consent
agreements, and recommendations for formal FTC complaints,
trade regulation rules, industry guides, and policy statements.35
The wide spectrum of enforcement mechanisms available to the
FTC allows the agency to choose from among various remedies,
including the implementation of prophylactic measures, such as the
issuance of a new industry guide or enforcement policy
statement.36 These measures may guard against the potential evils
dietsupp.htm; News Release, Federal Trade Commission, Marketer of
Electronic Abdominal Exercise Belt Charged With Making False Claims
(Oct. 1, 2003) (announcing the FTC’s administrative complaint against
Telebrands Corp. for using deceptive practices, specifically
unsubstantiated product claims, in the marketing and selling of the “Ab
Force” exercise device), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/
abforce.htm.
34
FTC Operating Manual, supra note 30, at ch. 3.3.4.1.
35
Id. at ch. 3.1.3.4.
36
Issuance of a new industry guide may be appropriate “[w]here there is an
indication that a large number of persons are engaged in a similar type of
violation” or when widespread violations are threatened by the existence of
“competitive considerations” that may “cause many individual persons and
firms to adopt and be reluctant to abandon a particular practice until other
members of the industry have begun to do so.” Id. at ch. 8.3.3(1)-(2). The
Operating Manual instructs that, “[w]hen promulgation of a guide may provide
the impetus for members of an industry to voluntarily correct their business
practices and thereby eliminate violations, it can be an effective means of
achieving compliance.” Id. at ch. 8.3.3(2). Industry guides may be more
instructive than official FTC regulations because the Operating Manual
encourages industry guide drafters to include “meaningful factual criteria” for
determining when a violation exists rather than making blanket legal
conclusions, such as stating that a practice is illegal when it has the capacity to
deceive. Id. at ch. 8.3.3(3). For example, in 2001, the FTC promulgated the
Guides for the Jewelry, Precious Metals, and Pewter Industries, which
addressed such industry-wide issues as the proper usage of certain terms and
representations regarding gemstones, metals, and product quality. Federal Trade
Commission, For Business, Jewelry Guides, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/guides/jewel-gd.htm.
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inherent in certain industries before the FTC specifically targets
individuals or business entities by issuing complaints and holding
formal hearings.37 The FTC thus enjoys great discretion in crafting
remedies to combat deceptive practices.38 To assist agency
officials in determining whether particular practices are deceptive,
the FTC has developed a Policy Statement on Deception.39
A. The FTC’s Policy Statement on Deception: Factors for
Identifying Deceptive Practices
In recognition of the potential for confusion regarding the
reach of the FTC’s broad mandate, the agency sought to provide a
single definitive statement on what constitutes a deceptive act or
practice by issuing a Policy Statement on Deception (Policy
Statement) in 1983.40 Although FTC policy statements are not
binding law,41 they set forth the circumstances in which the
Issuance of an enforcement policy statement may be based on the
“accumulated expertise of the Commission acquired from numerous
investigations and proceedings concerning a particular industry or practice,” or
may be “the outgrowth of an independent Commission determination that
pronouncement of an interpretive statement or enforcement policy upon a
particular subject will further the public interest.” FTC Operating Manual, supra
note 30, at ch. 8.5.4. For example, in 1994, the FTC issued the Enforcement
Policy Statement on Food Advertising, explaining its joint enforcement
jurisdiction over food advertising with the Food and Drug Administration and
the FTC’s method of evaluating certain nutritional claims. Federal Trade
Commission, For Business, Advertising Guidance, Food Advertising, available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-food.htm.
37
See supra text accompanying note 2 (describing FTC enforcement
procedures).
38
FTC Operating Manual, supra note 30, at ch. 3.1.2.2 (explaining that
“[t]he Commission possesses broad jurisdiction to deal with unfair or deceptive
acts and practices and unfair methods of competition under the FTC [Act] and
the various special statutes enforced by the Commission”).
39
FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC
Policy Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.
htm.
40
Id.
41
FTC Operating Manual, supra note 30, at ch. 8.6.1 (stating that while
policy statements are intended to clarify the rules that they describe, they do not
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Commission intends to take corrective action, or provide
interpretive statements on laws or substantive rules.42 The FTC’s
1983 Policy Statement outlined three criteria that the FTC should
consider in determining whether a particular act or practice is
deceptive; each of the three factors must be present for the FTC to
intervene.43 These factors include the likelihood that the practice
will mislead the consumer, the reasonableness of the consumer’s
reaction to the practice, and the materiality of the practice from the
consumer’s perspective.
The FTC officially adopted the Policy Statement in In the
Matter of Cliffdale Associates.44 In that case, the administrative
law judge concluded that an unfair or deceptive practice was “any
advertising representation that ha[d] the tendency and capacity to
mislead or deceive a prospective purchaser.”45 The FTC, however,
rejected that approach as “circular and therefore inadequate to
provide guidance on how a deception claim should be analyzed.”46
Rather, the FTC explained that it must evaluate deceptive practices

have binding force).
42
Id. at ch. 8.5.2. The principle function of an enforcement policy
statement is to deter violations of the law by clarifying any ambiguities or
uncertainties that may arise concerning FTC enforcement policies. Id. at
ch. 8.5.3.
43
Id.
44
103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) (appending the Policy Statement to the decision).
The FTC held that Cliffdale engaged in deceptive acts and practices by making
unsubstantiated claims about its Ball-Matic Valve (an automobile retrofit
device). Id. Further, the FTC held that the claims were deceptive because
Cliffdale had failed to reveal its relationship with Ball-Matic endorsers, many of
whom were Cliffdale business associates being passed off as disinterested
customers. Id. In support of its decision, the FTC cited the FTC Guides, supra
note 3, at §§ 255.0-55.5, which require companies to disclose material
connections between the company and its product’s endorsers. Id. See infra Part
I.B for further discussion of the FTC Guides.
45
Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110.
46
Id. The FTC recognized that a clearer, more articulable standard was
necessary for evaluating deceptive practices. Simply asking whether the
particular alleged deceptive practice had a tendency to deceive an undefined
class of consumers provided no framework for future evaluations under the FTC
Act. Id.
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based on the factors laid out in its Policy Statement.47
1. The “Likely to Mislead” Factor
The Policy Statement provides that a practice will be deemed
deceptive only in the case of a “representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer.”48 Because Section
5 is more prophylactic than punitive in nature, a mere capacity to
deceive may garner FTC attention.49 Thus, a finding of deception
does not require actual deception so long as the practice is likely to
mislead.50 If an individual or entity induces contact with a
consumer through “a representation, practice, or omission that is
likely to mislead the consumer,”51 a violation of the Act will result,
even if the consumer is later informed about the marketer’s use of
deceptive tactics.52 Further, if a message’s overall impression is
misleading, it is no defense that some elements of the
communication are true because “words and sentences may be
literally and technically true and yet be framed in such a setting as
to mislead or deceive.”53 For example, in In the Matter of
47

Id.
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39.
49
FTC v. Sterling Drug, 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963). After noting the
broad scope of FTC power to regulate deceptive practices, the court held that the
FTC was not erroneously denied a temporary injunction against Sterling Drug.
Id. The FTC alleged that Sterling Drug deceived consumers by improperly
linking its drugs to an American Medical Association endorsement, but the court
found that the FTC failed to present sufficient evidence for such a finding at the
preliminary injunction stage. Id.
50
Id.; Resort Rental Car Sys. Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (1975)
(explaining that “advertising capable of being interpreted in a misleading way
should be construed against the advertiser” and that “actual deception need not
be shown”).
51
Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110.
52
Resort, 518 F.2d at 964 (explaining that “[t]he Federal Trade Act is
violated if [the act or practice in question] induces the first contact through
deception, even if the buyer later becomes fully informed”).
53
Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943). In
Bockenstette, the court upheld an FTC cease-and-desist order based on findings
that defendant hatchery owners deceptively advertised that they were linked to
the National Poultry Improvement Plan, which represented a choice group of
48
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Encyclopedia Britannica, the FTC found a deceptive omission in
violation of the FTC Act when sales representatives
misrepresented the purpose of their initial contact with
customers.54 Encyclopedia Britannica salespersons went door-todoor claiming to be conducting brand recognition surveys when, in
fact, the main purpose of their contact with the homeowners was to
sell encyclopedias.55 The FTC held such a failure to disclose
impermissible and deceptive because, although surveys were in
fact conducted, they were merely the gateway to encyclopedia
sales.56
2. The Reasonableness of Interpretation Factor
The Policy Statement provides that the second factor for
determining the existence of a deceptive act or practice is the
reasonableness of the consumer’s reaction to or interpretation of
the act or practice.57 The statement provides that “to be deceptive
the representation, omission or practice must be likely to mislead
reasonable consumers under the circumstances.”58 Reasonable,
however, does not necessarily mean intelligent or discerning.59
When reviewing FTC orders, courts recognize that in order to
receive protection, consumers should not be expected to be
especially bright or discerning.60 Indeed, as noted by the Supreme
female hens, when in fact they were not. Id. While the hatchery’s hens were
previously approved by the National Poultry Improvement Plan, once they came
under the defendants’ ownership they lost that title and could no longer be
advertised as such. Id.
54
87 F.T.C. 421 (1976).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39.
58
Id.
59
Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618 (3d Cir. 1976). In
Beneficial, the Court upheld an FTC order, holding that Beneficial’s
advertisements for loans to those entitled to income tax refunds were deceptive
because they failed to indicate that potential borrowers had to meet certain credit
standards set by Beneficial. Id.
60
Id. (quoting Callman, Unfair Competition and Trademarks § 19.2(a)(1),
which, inter alia, described the general consumer public as a vast multitude that
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Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education
Society,
[l]aws are made to protect the trusting as well as the
suspicious. The best element of business has long since
decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises,
and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied on to
reward fraud and deception.61
As to the act or practice in question, the Policy Statement cites
to Beneficial Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, in which the
FTC found that “[i]n determining the meaning of . . . a sales
presentation, the important criterion is the net impression that it is
likely to make on the general populace.”62 Expanding on this
notion, in American Home Products v. Federal Trade Commission,
the Third Circuit held that when considering the reasonableness of
the consumer’s reaction, the FTC has the right to examine the total
impression made by an advertising tactic.63 Otherwise, “the
Commission would have limited recourse against crafty advertisers
whose deceptive messages were conveyed by means other than, or
in addition to, spoken words.”64 Therefore, when considering a
consumer’s reaction to an act or practice, the FTC must
acknowledge that “[t]he ultimate impression upon the mind of the
[consumer] arises from the sum total of not only what is said but
includes “the ignorant, and unthinking and the credulous, who, in making
purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and
general impressions”); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942)
(quoting Callman as cited in Florence Mfg. Co. v. Dowd, 178 F. 73 2d Cir.
1910). The Aronberg court affirmed an FTC cease-and-desist order against the
defendant, charging that Aronberg engaged in deceptive practices by advertising
his over-the-counter medicinal remedy without revealing its potential dangers to
consumers’ health. Id.
61
302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
62
Beneficial, 542 F.2d at 618 (citing Grolier, 91 F.T.C. 315, 430 (1978),
remanded on other grounds, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980), modified on other
grounds, 98 F.T.C. 882 (1981), reissued, 99 F.T.C. 379 (1982)).
63
695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). In American Home Products, the court held
that substantial evidence supported an FTC finding that the defendant
deceptively represented that its nonprescription analgesics were proven superior
to competitors.
64
Id. at 688.
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also of all that is reasonably implied.”65
3. Materiality Factor
The Policy Statement also requires that the representation,
omission, or practice be “material” in order to give rise to a finding
of deception.66 The Policy Statement defines a material
representation as an act or practice likely to affect the consumer’s
conduct or decision with regard to the challenged product or
service.67 So long as materiality is found, it is irrelevant whether a
consumer was actually deceived by the practice.68 In Federal
Trade Commission v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., the Supreme Court
made clear that material representations or omissions are not
limited to those related to the substantive aspects of the product or
service being promoted.69 Indeed, the Court held that any
representations or omissions that materially induce consumer
action are subject to the proscriptions of the Act.70
65

Aronberg, 132 F.2d at 167 (noting that the public is often influenced by
appearances and general impressions and not simply the specific language used
in advertisements).
66
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. The Policy Statement cites the
definition of materiality in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND § 538(2)
(1977), which states that a material misrepresentation or omission is one that
“the reasonable person would regard as important in deciding how to act, or one
which the maker knows the recipient, because of his or her own peculiarities, is
likely to consider important.” The RESTATEMENT § 538(2)(a) cmt. d (1977)
states that the material fact does not necessarily have to affect the money paid in
a transaction and explains that “there are many more-or-less sentimental
considerations that the ordinary man regards as important.” Id.
67
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39.
68
Id.
69
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 386-87 (rejecting respondent’s
argument that “the only material facts are those which deal with the substantive
qualities of a product,” in favor of the FTC’s position that “the
misrepresentation of any fact so long as it materially induces a purchaser’s
decision to buy is a deception prohibited by § 5”). In Colgate-Palmolive, the
Court reinstated an FTC order that held that the undisclosed use of a prop made
of plexiglass and sand in a commercial to simulate a razor shaving a piece of
sandpaper clean was a material deceptive practice. Id.
70
Id. Accordingly, deception may stem from marketing or advertising
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B. FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising
In addition to its Policy Statement on Deception, the FTC has
provided guidance regarding the use of advertising endorsements
in Section 255 of Title 16 of the Code of Federal Regulations.71
Promulgated by the FTC, this section, known as the FTC Guides
Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising,72 defines endorsement as
[a]ny advertising message (including verbal statements,
demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature,
likeness or other identifying personal characteristics of an
individual or the name or seal of an organization) which
message consumers are likely to believe reflects the
opinions, beliefs, findings, or experience of a party other
than the sponsoring advertiser. The party whose opinions,
beliefs, findings, or experience the message appears to
reflect will be called the endorser and may be an individual,
group or institution.73
Section 255.5 provides that when there is a material connection
between an endorser and the seller of an advertised product that
might “materially affect the weight or credibility of the
endorsement,74 such connection must be fully disclosed.”75
Specifically, the FTC mandates that if actors are employed to pose
as actual customers, this fact must be disclosed to the public.76 The
methods, not just from unsubstantiated product claims.
71
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at §§ 255.0-255.5.
72
15 U.S.C. § 57a (1914) (giving the FTC authority to prescribe rules with
respect to deceptive acts or practices in and affecting commerce).
73
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.0(b) (emphasis added).
74
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5. In other words, the connection is
not reasonably expected by the audience.
75
Id. (emphasis added).
76
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.2(b). The regulations state,
“[a]dvertisements presenting endorsements by what are represented, directly or
by implication, to be ‘actual customers’ should utilize actual customers, both in
the audio and video or clearly and conspicuously disclose that the persons in
such advertisements are not actual customers of the advertised product.” Id.
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FTC clarified the appropriate application of the regulation with the
following hypothetical example:
An advertisement purports to portray a “hidden camera”
situation in a crowded cafeteria at breakfast time. A
spokesperson for the advertiser asks a series of actual
patrons of the cafeteria for their spontaneous, honest
opinions of the advertiser’s recently introduced breakfast
cereal. Even though the words “hidden camera” are not
displayed on the screen, and even though none of the actual
patrons is specifically identified during the advertisement,
the net impression conveyed to consumers may well be that
these are actual consumers, and not actors. If the actors
have been employed, that fact should be disclosed.77
II. UNDERCOVER MARKETING IS A DECEPTIVE PRACTICE BASED ON
FTC STANDARDS
A marketing industry publication aimed at chief marketing
officers defines undercover marketing as “the use of actors or shills
to pitch a product in a public place without it being revealed that
they are salespeople.”78 Advertising and marketing industry leaders
and numerous consumer advocacy groups are increasingly
questioning and criticizing the use of this practice.79 The executive
director for the Center for Digital Democracy calls the undercover
77

FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.2, Example 3 (emphasis added). Part
III of this note further discusses the FTC’s application of the FTC Guides
to infomercials and argues that undercover marketing is as deceptive as certain
infomercial practices, which are heavily regulated by the FTC.
78
Lingo Lab: A Marketing Glossary: Undercover Marketing, CMO
Magazine, available at http://www.cmomagazine.com/glossary/term.html?
CID=55.
79
Suzanne Vranica, That Guy Showing Off His Hot New Phone May Be a
Shill, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at B1 (noting that the executive director of
Commercial Alert, a nonprofit consumer activist organization, criticizes
undercover marketing as deceptive); Walking, Talking Stealth Ads, supra note 7
(explaining that many people in the advertising industry agree with consumer
protection advocates that undercover marketers go too far and quoting a
managing director of Atlanta’s Titan Advertising who argues that undercover
marketers are lying to and deceiving the public).
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marketing phenomenon the “brand-washing of America.”80
Nevertheless, the FTC thus far has taken no initiative to challenge
the practice, despite its signature element of deceptiveness.81
Although the FTC has no specific regulations addressing the
practice of undercover marketing, its authority to regulate
undercover marketing falls within the sweeping coverage of
Section 5 of the FTC Act.82
As a threshold matter, the FTC has jurisdiction to regulate
undercover marketing as a form of advertising in and affecting
commerce.83 Advertising has been defined to include “[a]ny action
intended to draw the attention of the public or of a segment thereof
to merchandise, a service, a person or organization, or to a line of
conduct.”84 Undercover marketing easily falls within this
categorization. Operatives take action to draw unsuspecting
consumers’ attention to a certain product.85 Typical undercover
marketing techniques include placing attractive young men and
80

Daniel Eisenberg & Laura Bradford, It’s an Ad, Ad, Ad, Ad World: As
Conventional Methods Lose Their Punch, More Marketers are Going
Undercover to Reach Customers, TIME (Canadian Edition), Sept. 23, 2002
(explaining that critics believe that undercover marketing “tinker[s]” with
consumers’ minds). The Center for Digital Democracy seeks to enhance public
understanding of the U.S. digital media system and make the media industry
more accountable to the public interest. See CDD Mission Statement, at
http://www.democraticmedia.org/cddmissionstatement.html.
81
As of Apr. 19, 2005, all articles and sources cited in and researched in
preparation for this note fail to report any FTC proceedings against undercover
marketers.
82
15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(2) (1938) (stating “[t]he Commission is hereby
empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . .
from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”).
83
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39 (explaining that marketing
practices, such as bait-and-switch schemes or providing incomplete information
to the consumer, are covered by the Act in addition to traditional advertising);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(2) (empowering and directing the FTC to “prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using . . . unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce”).
84
O’Brien, supra note 26, at 276 (quoting George E. Rosden & Peter E.
Rosden, The Law of Advertising, 17.02[2] at 17-36 (1995).
85
60 Minutes, supra note 7.
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women in bars to conspicuously talk about how great their vodka
tastes and recommend that other patrons order the same,86 paying
mothers to extol the benefits of their new laundry detergent at their
children’s Little League games,87 and compensating celebrities to
appear on talk shows and praise prescription drugs without
indicating that they are spokespersons for the manufacturer.88
Although FTC spokespersons have indicated that undercover
marketing raises concerns, in their view, undercover marketing
may simply be unethical, not illegal.89 An assistant director of the
FTC’s Advertising Practices Division has said of undercover
marketing, “It’s troubling, but whether it rises to the level of being
illegal is not clear. At a minimum it’s not clear that there’s enough
harm done to make it a priority for the FTC.”90 However, an
analysis of a typical undercover marketing encounter reveals that
the success of undercover marketing depends on meeting all three
of the FTC’s criteria for a deceptive practice,91 none of which
references injury or “harm done” to the consumer.92 Therefore, the
FTC is empowered to regulate undercover marketing and should
make regulation of this deceptive practice a priority.
An example of a typical undercover marketing scheme assists
in illustrating the deceptive nature of this practice. In 2002, Sony
Ericsson hired the marketing firm Interference, Inc. and launched
86

Jim Rutenberg, Phenomenon (Buy Me), N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at 21.
Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Advertisers Go Undercover to Push
Products, FOX NEWS, Aug. 17, 2001, available at http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0%2C2933%2C32179%2C00.html.
88
Eisenberg, supra note 80.
89
Jana Ritter, Buyer Beware: Uncovering Undercover Advertising, THE
GALT GLOBAL REVIEW, Mar. 18, 2003, at http://www.galtglobalreview.com/
business/ buyer_beware.html (explaining that the Federal Trade Commission
has yet to charge Big Fat Promotions, Inc. with anything other than bad taste);
Donaldson-Evans, supra note 87 (quoting Mary Engle, assistant director of the
FTC’s advertising practices division).
90
Donaldson-Evans, supra note 87.
91
See Part II.A-C (noting the three factors necessary in order to find the
existence of a deceptive practice, including “likely to mislead,” “reasonableness
of interpretation” and “materiality”).
92
See Part I.A. 3 (noting that actual consumer deception is not necessary
for a practice to be deemed deceptive so long as there is a capacity to deceive).
87
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its “fake tourist” campaign.93 Sony sent actors to crowded tourist
destinations, such as New York’s Times Square and Seattle’s
Space Needle, to pose as tourists.94 The operatives went out in
pairs, posing as boyfriend and girlfriend, and asked passersby if
they would mind taking pictures of the couple.95 The operatives
handed willing parties a new Sony camera cell phone, acting as if
it were their own, and initiated conversations about the phone and
its various features.96 At no point during the interaction did the
operatives reveal that they were employed by Sony to market the
new camera phone.97
Sony’s campaign is representative of many undercover
marketing schemes and, as such, it may serve to highlight the
applicability of the FTC’s criteria for identifying deceptive
practices to undercover marketing.98 Indeed, Sony’s campaign
satisfies each of the FTC’s criteria for deception, thus indicating
that undercover marketing is ripe for FTC regulation and
enforcement action. First, Sony misleads consumers by omitting
the fact that the “tourists” are actually paid endorsers.99 Second,
the beliefs of consumers that they are not part of a paid marketing
campaign when they are spontaneously stopped on the street are
93

Vranica, supra note 79; 60 Minutes, supra note 7. See also Case Study:
Sony Ericsson, at http://www.interferenceinc.com/sony.html. The case study
outlines the marketing elements utilized in the Sony campaign, including fake
tourists and “leaners,” the term used for attractive actors placed in bars and clubs
to promote the camera.
94
Vranica, supra note 79; 60 Minutes, supra note 7 (noting that in Times
Square, the “ancient home of American marketing, people on the street once
“picked pockets, but now, they mess with your mind”).
95
Vranica, supra note 79 (noting that the operatives have no intention of
identifying that they work for Sony); 60 Minutes, supra note 7.
96
Vranica, supra note 79 (explaining that the idea is to have consumers
believe that they’ve “stumbled onto a hot new product”); 60 Minutes, supra note
7.
97
Vranica, supra note 79; 60 Minutes, supra note 7 (explaining that the
Sony operatives were “irresistibly innocent looking” and that the “Good
Samaritan” picture-taking consumers had no idea that they were “being had”).
98
See supra Part I.A (outlining the three FTC criteria for finding a practice
deceptive).
99
See infra Part II.A.
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entirely reasonable.100 Finally, Sony’s failure to disclose the true
nature of the interaction is a material omission.101
A. Failure to Disclose That Undercover Operatives Are Paid
Marketers Is An Omission Likely to Mislead the
Consumer
In order to qualify as a deceptive practice, the Policy Statement
first requires that there be an omission likely to mislead the
customer.102 Undercover marketing easily satisfies this criterion
because the omission in undercover marketing is the essence of the
sales pitch. Instead of deceiving the consumer about a particular
attribute of the product or service, a successful undercover
marketing operative deceives the consumer into believing that he is
not being marketed to at all.103 In fact, the thought should never
enter the consumer’s mind and, if it does, the undercover
marketing interaction is viewed as a failure.104 If an undercover
marketing operative fails to disclose that she is paid by a company
to promote its product and gives no information to that effect, the
customer is almost certain to be deceived by this omission.105
With undercover marketing, omission is the mission.106 In fact,
100

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
102
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. See Part I.A.1.
103
See Part I.A.1 (discussing deceptive representations and omissions).
104
Undercover Agencies, supra note 16 (noting undercover marketer
Jonathan Ressler’s insistence that his operatives’ true identities remain secret in
order to preserve the success of the campaign).
105
A useful comparison may be made to infomercials, a marketing practice
heavily targeted by the FTC in recent years. See Lewis, supra note 21; O’Brien,
supra note 26. Infomercials are troubling to the FTC because it is rarely clear
whether the audience members or endorsers in the infomercials are paid for their
participation, thereby creating a tendency to deceive viewers. See Lewis, supra
note 21. Undercover marketing is much the same. The deception lies not in the
claims about the product, but in the representation that the endorser has no
financial connection to the product he is extolling. See infra Part III for a further
discussion of this comparison.
106
John Heinzl, Beware Tourists With Talking Cameras, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, Aug. 1, 2002, at A1 (commenting on the Sony “fake tourist” operatives,
101
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“[t]he whole key to undercover marketing is never knowing that
it’s going on.”107 Once a consumer finds out that the person he was
chatting with is actually a shill, the cover is blown and the
transaction loses its effectiveness.108 In the Sony cell phone
campaign, for example, the passerby is not told that the “tourist” is
actually a Sony employee.109 The seemingly innocent acts of being
asked to take a photograph and engaging in friendly banter about
the camera are not likely to tip off consumers that they are really
the targets of a marketing pitch. A skillful operative cleverly
disguises her mission.110 Consequently, there is an omission that is
likely to deceive.111 Further, in addition to the Policy Statement,
the endorsement-specific regulations contained in the FTC Guides
Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising112 provide that when marketers do not reveal that their
endorsers are paid, customers will be deemed to have been
unlawfully deceived.113 The scenario engineered by Sony’s
Jon Maron, director of marketing for Sony Ericsson, explained, “they’re not
identified as Sony Ericsson employees because it takes the spontaneity of the
conversation away”).
107
BAKAN, supra note 15, at 132-34 (quoting Jonathan Ressler of Big Fat
Promotions, Inc.).
108
Id.
109
Heinzl, supra note 106.
110
Undercover Agencies, supra note 16.
111
Encyclopedia Britannica, 87 F.T.C. 421.
112
FTC Guides, supra note 3, §§ 255.0-55.5. See Part I.B (discussing the
FTC Guides).
113
See, e.g., In the Matter of Creative Health, Inc., 2004 FTC LEXIS 51
(2004) (holding that Creative Health Inc. engaged in a deceptive practice in
violation of the FTC Act and the FTC Guides by failing to reveal that some
endorsers were principals in a public relations company that earned
commissions on sales related to its promotions and that other endorsers were
product distributors who earned profits based on their sales of the product); In
the Matter of TrendMark, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 375 (1998) (holding that TrendMark,
Inc.’s failure to reveal that its endorsers were distributors of its diet products
who earned profits on their sales was a deceptive practice in violation of the
FTC Act and the FTC Guides); In the Matter of Bodywise International, Inc.,
120 F.T.C. 704 (1995) (holding that Bodywise International, Inc.’s failure to
reveal that its endorsers were healthcare professionals and physicians who
derived income from Bodywise product sales was a deceptive practice in
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operatives ensures this result.
B. Consumers in Undercover Marketing Campaigns Will Not
Reasonably Suspect That They Are the Subjects of a
Sales Pitch
The second criterion in evaluating a potentially deceptive
practice requires an examination of the act or practice from the
perspective of a consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances.114 The relevant question is whether the consumer’s
reaction to or interpretation of a practice is reasonable; in this case,
whether a consumer’s impression that he was not part of a paid
marketing interaction is reasonable.115
Undercover marketers strive to penetrate consumers’ lives and
buying processes in a seamless and undetectable manner.116 The
goal of undercover marketers is to make sure that the deception is
as authentic as possible.117 The target audience is the 18- to 34year-old market, a market that increasingly rejects the traditional,
obvious sales pitch.118 Operatives will congregate in places where
consumers usually gather, such as bars and parks.119 They have
violation of the FTC Act and the FTC Guides).
114
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. See also Part I.A. 2.
115
The FTC Policy Statement explains that the appropriate inquiry is
whether the consumer’s interpretation of a practice is reasonable. See supra note
39. Therefore, in an undercover marketing situation, the appropriate inquiry
would be whether the consumer’s belief that he was conversing with an average
Joe or Jane is reasonable.
116
Undercover Agencies, supra note 16 (quoting John Palumbo, Big Fat
Promotions, Inc.’s chief strategy officer). Palumbo explained, “[P]eople have to
see [the product], they have to understand it in a real way. The only way for
them to understand it in a real way is for it to be in their world. And that’s what
we do. We put it in their life.” Id.
117
Rutenberg, supra note 86.
118
Maye, supra note 10 (explaining that Jonathan Ressler believes that
undercover marketing is the only way to reach young people who are “too savvy
to fall for traditional advertising methods”); The Evening Standard, supra note 8
(noting that 12- to 34-year-old consumers are especially hard to reach because
they have “grown up with the heavy-sell and are now inured to it”).
119
Rutenberg, supra note 86.
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similar physical characteristics as the consumers, enabling them to
fit in with the target audience, or are especially attractive in order
to attract the attention of the target audience.120 When the
marketing communication is over, the consumers should have no
inclination that they were the subjects of a marketing pitch.121
Undercover marketing actors who do their jobs well create the
reasonable impression that they are not being paid to push a
product.122 Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable for consumers to
believe that they are not part of a paid marketing interaction. The
“sum total” of what is said and what is reasonably implied would
lead a reasonable consumer to believe that he was innocently
conversing with a friendly passerby, not that he was the subject of
an undercover marketing scheme.123
By way of example, Essential Reality, a gaming company,
launched an undercover campaign to promote its new “P-5 Glove,”
a gaming accessory that enables users to fly planes and fire
weapons on their computers.124 Innocent-looking actors were hired
to place themselves in Starbucks coffee shops, use the glove, and
120

Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Roobina Ohanian, Recent Trends in the Law of
Endorsement Advertising: Infomercials, Celebrity Endorsers and Nontraditional
Defendants in Deceptive Advertising Cases, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603 (1991)
(explaining that endorsement marketing is most effective when the consumer
can identify with the endorser); The Evening Standard, supra note 8 (explaining
that undercover marketing companies choose their operatives with care to find
just the right look for the target consumer).
121
Rutenberg, supra note 86.
122
Id.
123
Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942) (explaining that
“[t]he ultimate impression upon the mind of the [consumer] arises from the
sum total of not only what is said but also of all that is reasonably
implied”); see, e.g., 60 Minutes, supra note 7 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell,
author of THE TIPPING POINT). Gladwell explained of undercover marketing:
[T]here’s a set of rules that govern a lot of advertising and we’re aware
of the rules. We’re aware that the woman in the advertising for Ivory
Soap is prettier than most women in our lives. A line is crossed, I think,
when you go outside of those normal boundaries and start to deceive
people in ways that they are . . . totally unwitting to what’s going on.
Id.
124
60 Minutes, supra note 7.
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initiate conversation about the device.125 John Flaherty, an
unsuspecting coffee drinker, conversed with one of the actors
about the glove.126 When later told by 60 Minutes broadcast
producers that he was a subject in an undercover campaign, he
admitted that there was something disturbing about the scheme
once he learned the true purpose of the interaction.127 The Sony
“fake tourist” example is similar.128
The FTC might seek to regulate undercover marketing by
proscribing practices that deceive only the most savvy of
consumers;129 however, the FTC’s protection is intended for all
consumers, regardless of varied levels of intelligence, naivety, or
skepticism.130 Judging by the efforts expended by undercover
marketers to maintain their cover as average consumers, it is
highly unlikely that consumers will take away the reasonable
impression that they are conversing with paid actors.131

125

Id.
Id.
127
Id. Flaherty explained, “[i]t just seemed to me like a nice, friendly
encounter, and it kind of restores your faith in your fellow New Yorkers. And
then, to find out it was all fake, it was just kind of, I don’t know—I don’t like, I
don’t like the ring of it.” Id.
128
Vranica, supra note 79 (quoting Gary Ruskin, executive director of
consumer activist organization Commercial Alert). When told of the Sony
campaign, Ruskin argued, “[i]t’s deceptive. People will be fooled into thinking
this is honest buzz.” Id.
129
Lewis, supra note 21, at 860 (explaining that the FTC’s protection is
universal and intended for the gamut of American consumers). Lewis explains
that the FTC is “the guardian of the ignorant, unthinking and credulous, the
defender of ‘Mortimer Snerds’ and the protector of ‘wayfaring men, though
fools.’ This victim of deception may not read all that he should, and may merely
grab a general impression.” Id.
130
Id.
131
Vranica, supra note 79 (explaining that Sony has “gone to great lengths
to train its actors to avoid detection”). Peter Groome, president of Omnicom
Group Inc.’s Fathom Communications, explained, “[i]f you put [the actors] in a
Sony Ericsson shirt, then people are going to be less likely to listen to them in a
bar.” Id.
126
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C. The Failure to Reveal That Undercover Operatives Are Paid
Marketers Is a Material Omission
The final requirement for finding a deceptive practice is that
the omission be material.132 A material omission is one that is
likely to affect the customer’s disposition toward the product being
pitched.133 Undercover marketing clearly satisfies this final
criterion, given that its ultimate goal is to favorably influence the
customer’s attitude toward the product.134 If Sony did not believe
that its stealth tactics would help to sell more camera phones or
generate greater buzz about its product, it would have relied
exclusively upon traditional advertising mechanisms to increase
sales.135 However, companies such as Sony and Essential Reality
are increasingly cognizant of the potential to increase profits
through the use of interpersonal deception.136 As a result of the
“fake tourist” campaign, Interference, Inc. reports that Sony
realized a fifty-percent increase in sales in the markets in which the
undercover marketing campaign was conducted.137 Marketers
recognize the importance of protecting their operatives’ identities,
and undercover marketing executives rarely divulge their client
132

FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39.
Id. The Policy Statement explains that “[w]here the seller knew, or
should have known, that an ordinary consumer would need omitted information
to evaluate the product or service . . . materiality will be presumed because the
manufacturer intended the . . . omission to have an effect.” Id.
134
Steinberg, supra note 14.
135
Maye, supra note 10 (noting that undercover marketers believe that
undercover marketing tactics are necessary to reach savvy, young consumers
who are unaffected by traditional advertising methods).
136
BAKAN, supra note 15 (arguing that corporations have no problem
deceiving consumers so long as they can benefit financially from the
interaction); Steinberg, supra note 14 (quoting marketing executives who say
that the trend in advertising must be to interpersonal communication and away
from traditional media); Alyson Ward, Marketers Finding Sneaky New Ways to
Pitch, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 17, 2002, at E1 (noting that
marketers are learning that they have to reach out to consumers where they
congregate, not just through a television set).
137
Case study: Sony Ericsson, Interference Inc. Home, Case Studies, Sony
Ericsson, at http://www.interferenceinc.com/sony.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2005).
133
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lists for fear of confidentiality breaches that could blow open
ongoing campaigns.138
Undercover marketing operatives are not merely satisfied
customers who wish to spread the joy they have found from using
the product they are pitching. They instead are being paid to make
the product look and sound as appealing as possible while posing
as a typical consumer.139 The use of this tactic makes undercover
marketing operatives endorsers by FTC standards because they are
advancing an advertising message that consumers are likely to
think is independent of the sponsoring marketer.140 When the
omission is related to an endorsement, the FTC specifically
mandates that any material connection between an endorser and
the seller of the product be disclosed.141 Given that omissions
relating to endorsements are considered material by the FTC,
undercover marketing-specific endorsement omissions should
receive due attention by the FTC. Marketers are required to
disclose to consumers material connections between endorsers and
sellers, and naturally, undercover marketing would be of no value
if this connection were disclosed.142 Indeed, companies require that
undercover operatives sign confidentiality agreements to ensure
that the marketers do not reveal that they are being paid to promote
the product.143 Customers deserve protection from these tactics
because such material omissions offend contemporary notions of
fairness,144 and more importantly, expressly violate FTC
138

Steinberg, supra note 14 (explaining that marketers are wary of naming
names for fear of rendering the campaigns ineffective).
139
Jim McBeth, Buying into the Virus, THE SCOTSMAN, Aug. 17, 2001, at 4
(explaining that undercover marketing operatives should be approachable and
not too good looking or obvious).
140
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.0 (providing that “[t]he party
whose opinions, beliefs, findings, or experience the [advertising] message
appears to reflect will be called the endorser and may be an individual,
group or institution”).
141
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5.
142
Id.
143
BAKAN, supra note 15, at 134 (noting that undercover operatives are
contractually bound to conceal their relationships by the companies that employ
them).
144
Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of
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regulations.145
In In the Matter of Cliffdale Associates, Inc.,146 the FTC,
interpreting the FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising,147 opined that consumers are far more
likely to rely on endorsements they believe to be “independent and
unbiased” than those they know to be compensated.148 The FTC
held that the company’s failure to disclose the relationship between
itself and the endorsers materially affected the weight consumers
gave to a particular endorsement.149 Because making a false claim
of impartiality is material to consumers, such an omission is a
deceptive practice under the Act and the FTC Guides.150 For the
FTC, therefore, what matters is whether the consumer would have
thought differently of the message had he known it was
communicated by a paid employee.151 The agency’s holding in
Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L.
REV. 1 (1985) (arguing that fairness is the goal of advertising regulation).
145
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39; FTC Guides, supra note 3, at §
255.
146
103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
147
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at §§ 255.0-55.5.
148
Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
O’Brien, supra note 26. See also FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 cmt. d (1977)). The
Restatement explains that a material fact does not necessarily have to hinge on
the finances of the transaction, stating that “there are many more-or-less
sentimental considerations that the ordinary man regards as important.” The
inclusion of this Comment in the FTC Policy Statement indicates that the FTC
realizes that consumers are not solely concerned with the money they lose
because of deceptive practices. Undercover marketing affects emotions as well
in that one should be able to trust those with whom one interacts to be
forthcoming about their purposes for the interaction. See also 60 Minutes, supra
note 7 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell, author of THE TIPPING POINT). Of
undercover marketing, Gladwell noted:
Part of what makes real word-of-mouth so powerful is the
understanding that we have . . . that the person telling us about it is
telling us about it for . . . disinterested reasons. They’re not being paid
by somebody. They have our interests at heart. That is worlds apart
from a situation where the person telling us something is telling us that
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Cliffdale has been consistently applied to subsequent FTC
enforcement actions related to the failure of endorsers to reveal to
consumers their material connections with marketers, and applies
easily to undercover marketing.152
III. UNDERCOVER MARKETING SHOULD BE REGULATED BY THE
FTC, GIVEN ITS MARKED SIMILARITY TO INFOMERCIALS, WHICH
ARE THE SUBJECTS OF HEAVY FTC SCRUTINY
Since the 1990s, the FTC has strictly regulated deceptive
practices in the “infomercial” industry.153 Infomercials take the
form of full-length talk show programs (often enhanced by studio
audiences) devoted exclusively to demonstrating the particular
product being marketed.154 The product demonstrators and
audience members endorsing the product in these programs appear
to be objective and independent of the company selling the
product.155 In light of the potential of these programs to confuse
consumers, the FTC has found that infomercials violate the FTC
Act’s proscriptions on deceptive practices when they are designed
because they have some private agenda. They’re getting paid. They’re
being planted.
Id.
152

See, e.g., In the Matter of Melinda R. Sneed, 128 F.T.C. 322 (1999)
(holding that the Sneeds’ failure to disclose that John Sneed, as an endorser,
received a financial benefit from product sales was a deceptive practice in
violation of the FTC Act because such a fact would materially affect the weight
and credibility given by customers to the endorsement and would be material to
customers in their decision to purchase the product); In the Matter of Taleigh
Corp., 119 F.T.C. 835 (1995) (holding that Taleigh’s failure to disclose that
endorsers of its diet pills were compensated was a deceptive practice in violation
of the FTC Act because such a fact would be material to customers in making
purchase decisions regarding the products).
153
O’Brien, supra note 26 (citing several enforcement actions and
explaining that “‘[i]nfomercials,’ which are program-length advertisements
which frequently masquerade as talk shows, are quickly becoming a favorite
target of the FTC”). According to the FTC, infomercials are advertisements
“presented in the guise of a talk-show format.” FTC v. California Pacific
Research, Inc., No. CV-N-88-602BRT, 1991 WL 208470, at *3 (D. Nev. 1991).
154
Lewis, supra note 21, at 853.
155
Id. at 869.
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to look like independent television programs rather than paid
commercial advertising, and thus, are likely to mislead
consumers.156 Additionally, the FTC has found that the failure of
infomercial sponsors to disclose that demonstrators and
participants receive compensation from the sponsors constitutes a
violation of the FTC Guides on Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising.157 The guides mandate disclosure of any material
connection between an endorser and the sponsor company.158
The FTC has instituted enforcement actions against several
companies for broadcasting infomercials that are presented as
independent television programs rather than paid commercial
advertisements.159 In In re Twin Star Products,160 a highly
publicized enforcement action, the FTC enjoined Twin Star from
scripting its infomercials in a way that misled consumers into
156

See, e.g., In the Matter of Bogdana Corporation, 126 F.T.C. 37 (1998)
(finding that Bogdana employed a deceptive format for its infomercials in
violation of the FTC Act by expressly or impliedly representing that the
infomercials were independent radio programs, not paid commercial
advertising); In the Matter of Mega Systems International, Inc., 1998 FTC
LEXIS 207 (finding that Mega Systems engaged in deceptive acts and practices
in violation of the FTC Act by formatting its infomercials so as to resemble
independent television programming, not paid commercial advertising); In the
Matter of Nutrivida, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 339 (1998) (finding that Nutrivida made
false and misleading representations in violation of the FTC Act by expressly or
impliedly representing that its infomercials were independent television
programs, not paid commercial advertising); In the Matter of Wyatt Marketing
Corp. Inc., 118 F.T.C. 117 (1993) (finding that Wyatt’s infomercial format
constituted a deceptive practice in violation of the FTC Act because it expressly
or impliedly represented itself as an independent television program, not a paid
commercial advertiser).
157
In re Twin Star Prods. Inc., No. C 3307 (FTC Oct. 2, 1990) (decision
and order) (enjoining Twin Star from further broadcasting its infomercials and
from making deceptive claims about its paid endorsers); FTC Guides, supra note
3, at § 255.5.
158
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. See supra Part I.B (explaining the
coverage of the FTC Guides).
159
See supra note 156 for several examples of typical infomercial
injunctions.
160
In re Twin Star Prods. Inc., No. C 3307 (FTC Oct. 2, 1990) (decision
and order).
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believing that the broadcasted pieces were independent consumer
programs.161 In particular, Twin Star deceptively represented that
endorsers appearing on the program reflected “[t]ypical members
of the public who . . . were independent from all entities marketing
the product, when, in fact, the endorsers were its paid
employees.”162 The FTC’s action against Twin Star indicates that
the agency recognizes the danger inherent in fooling consumers
into believing that they are hearing endorsements from purportedly
objective consumers.163
Undercover marketing is similarly problematic. Infomercials
first attracted the attention of the FTC because of their deceptive
format.164 Product demonstrators and audience members appeared
to be extolling the benefits of products of their own accord.165
Undercover marketing campaigns employ the same tactics, using
seemingly objective and disinterested street operatives who are, in
actuality, paid actors.166 Both infomercial sponsors and undercover
marketers intend and strive to deceive customers to capture their
audiences’ attention and market their products.167 In light of the
parallel nature of these tactics, the FTC should similarly target
undercover marketing for enforcement action, given that
undercover marketing campaigns, much like infomercials, are
deceptively structured so as to resemble otherwise objective
interactions.
The infomercial format developed when advertisers realized
that while very few people would be inclined to sit and watch a
161

Id.
Id.
163
Id.
164
O’Brien, supra note 26 (discussing the FTC’s penchant for strictly
regulating infomercials). O’Brien explains, “So great are infomercials’ capacity
to deceive that they have been described as the ‘seamy underside of the
advertising business.’” Id. (citing Joanne Lipman, Infomercial Makers Try to
Clean Up Their Act, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1991, at B3).
165
See supra note 156 (citing examples of typical FTC enforcement actions
based on the false independence of the demonstrators and audience members).
166
Walking, Talking Stealth Ads, supra note 7.
167
Lewis, supra note 21, at 871 (arguing that infomercial producers never
intend clarity in their advertisements because of the need to make customers
believe that they are watching an objective television program).
162
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thirty-minute commercial, many more people would watch a
thirty-minute commercial disguised as an objective talk show.168
Similarly, undercover marketing developed when marketers
realized that their target audience, resistant to traditional
advertising, would be much more willing to listen to an average
Joe or Jane than a paid spokesperson.169 Based on the FTC’s active
regulation of infomercials,170 logic dictates that the FTC should be
just as concerned with undercover marketing because, like
infomercials, undercover marketing campaigns are premised on
attempts to deceive consumers through the use of orchestrated
endorsements.171
IV. A CALL FOR ACTION BY THE FTC
The FTC thus far has failed to seriously scrutinize undercover
marketing practices. The public record is devoid of pending
168

Id. at 865.
Maye, supra note 10 (explaining that undercover marketers believe that
going undercover is the only way to reach consumers ages 12 to 34 who are “too
savvy to fall for traditional advertising methods”).
170
See supra note 156 for several examples of typical infomercial
injunctions.
171
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5 (stating that any material
connection between an endorser and a seller of a product must be disclosed).
This blanket rule applies to any marketing practice, regardless of form, so long
as an endorsement is involved. On its official website, the FTC addresses
infomercials in a section titled Frequently Asked Advertising Questions, warning
potential infomercial sponsors that they should make sure not to “deceptively
mimic the format of news reports, talk shows or other independent
programming.” Further, recognizing that many infomercials contain
endorsements, the FTC refers interested parties to the FTC Guides on
Testimonials and Endorsements in Advertising, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
conline/pubs/buspubs/ad-faqs.htm. Although the FTC Guides do not specifically
mention infomercials, it is clear that the rule is intended to cover all
endorsements. Undercover marketing, like infomercials, utilizes endorsements
and, as such, is subject to the FTC Guides governing endorsements. FTC
Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.0-55.5. The FTC should, therefore, give
undercover marketing the same attention it has given to infomercials, given the
analogous nature of the practices. See Part III (discussing the similarities
between infomercials and undercover marketing).
169
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investigations of the practice, filings of individualized FTC
complaints, or entries of enforcement orders against specific
undercover marketers.172 However, undercover marketing
undeniably is a deceptive practice under FTC standards,173 and
therefore, the FTC should take affirmative measures to regulate
this practice.
Several policy reasons support the FTC’s regulation of
undercover marketing. First, given the FTC’s broad power to
regulate deceptive practices, the agency should not shy away from
regulating undercover marketing simply because the practice is an
innovative one.174 If the FTC fails to regulate such new
technologies, the effectiveness of its regulation of deceptive
practices will be severely diminished.175 Additionally, the FTC
should act to regulate undercover marketers based on the
increasing threat to consumer protection posed by the nowblossoming use of undercover marketing campaigns by top
corporations.176 Moreover, should undercover marketing tactics
come to the attention of the public, consumer backlash might
result; the FTC would be wise to anticipate this response and
proactively protect the consumer market.177 Finally, undercover
marketing creates a culture of deception that is antithetical to the
mandate of the FTC, an agency created for the express purpose of
ensuring fair and honest commercial practices.178
A. The FTC’s Authority and Responsibility to Widen Its Scope
of Investigation and Enforcement to Cover New
Technologies, Including Undercover Marketing
The FTC has a duty to act in the interest of the public and
172

Based on Westlaw and Lexis Nexis searches of FTC proceedings as of
Apr. 19, 2005.
173
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39; FTC Guides, supra note 3, at §
255.
174
See infra Part IV.A.
175
Id.
176
See infra Part IV.B.
177
See infra Part IV.C.
178
See infra Part IV.D.
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investigate deceptive acts and practices.179 Given the expanding
budgets devoted to and the scope of undercover marketing
campaigns, the FTC should act expeditiously to regulate this
marketing technique.180 Currently, undercover marketing is
primarily of interest only to journalists. Notably, articles on this
marketing practice are devoid of any mention of FTC action.181
Perhaps more telling, when interviewed on the subject, Jonathan
Ressler, of Big Fat Promotions, Inc., reported that he has yet to
hear from the FTC and does not expect to.182
Although undercover marketing is significantly different in
form from traditional print and broadcast advertising, the FTC
should not retreat from regulating this marketing practice,
particularly in light of the widespread criticism that undercover
marketing has garnered from both consumer groups and
advertising executives.183 In American Home Products v. Federal
Trade Commission, the Supreme Court explained that the FTC
must be able to expand the parameters of its enforcement to ensure
that narrow investigatory or regulatory interpretations do not leave
loopholes through which marketers may accomplish the prohibited

179

15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1914).
There are emerging signs of awareness of the practice at the FTC. In a
New York Times Magazine interview, the assistant director of advertising
practices at the FTC said of undercover marketing, “If [sic] testimonial is
affiliated with you in some way, you have to disclose that.” However, the
director would not comment on whether the practice was being investigated.
Rutenberg, supra note 86. Another associate director for advertising practices at
the FTC told the Wall Street Journal that undercover marketing “certainly raises
ethical questions. At some point it raises legal questions. If a person in a bar
makes claims about a product without revealing the fact that he is being paid to
promote, you could well have FTC problems.” Steinberg, supra note 14.
181
As of Apr. 19, 2005, all articles cited in and researched in preparation
for this note fail to report any FTC proceedings against undercover marketers.
182
John Heinzl, Advertising Slinks Undercover, THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
July 20, 2001.
183
Heinzl, supra, note 106 (quoting Gary Ruskin, executive director of
Commercial Alert, who explained that undercover marketing is the
commercialization of human relationships); Rutenberg, supra note 86 (quoting
Jeff Chester, a board member at the Center for Media Education, who called
undercover marketers deceptive “commercial kamikazes”).
180
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goal of deception.184
Following this mandate, the FTC has continually widened its
lens of investigation to cover new technologies.185 In In the Matter
of All-State Industries of North Carolina, then-FTC Commissioner
Philip Elman explained that the FTC retains jurisdiction over
practices that may not have been thought of previously and has the
duty of developing a body of unfair trade practices law that is
“adapted to the diverse and changing needs of a complex and
evolving competitive system.”186 Undercover marketing, if left
unchecked, could severely diminish the effectiveness and bite of
the FTC’s regulation of deceptive practices.187 Section 5 of the Act
was drafted broadly for the specific purpose of giving the FTC the
necessary flexibility to combat “new and improved” deceptive
practices.188 Therefore, because the FTC is empowered to regulate
this deceptive practice, the agency should investigate undercover
marketing with vigor and resist justifying agency inaction by
referencing the innovative nature of the practice.

184

American Home Products, 695 F.2d at 704. The Court explained, “[i]f
the Commission is to attain the objectives Congress envisioned . . . it must be
allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that its order may
not be bypassed with impunity.” Id.
185
Lewis Rose, Stealth Marketing (Interactive Marketing Under
Government Scrutiny), MARKETING COMPUTERS, Apr. 1, 1995, at 20 (noting that
the FTC has applied its traditional rules to developing technologies over the
years, including print ads in 1914, radio ads in the 1920s, television ads in the
1950s, infomercials in the 1980s, and 900 numbers and Internet scams in the
1990s).
186
In the Matter of All-State Industries of North Carolina, Inc., 75 F.T.C.
465 (1969) (noting that the changing characteristics of the American
marketplace forced the FTC to focus its attention upon deceptive practices
associated with credit transactions).
187
American Home Products, 695 F.2d at 704. As the Court recognized in
American Home Products, the potential for innovation and craftiness in the
marketing industry makes it essential that the FTC enforce its provisions from
all angles. The Court pointed out, “[i]f the Commission is to attain the objectives
Congress envisioned . . . it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the
prohibited goal, so that its order may not be bypassed with impunity.” Id.
188
See supra Part I (noting the generality of Section 5).
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B. Undercover Marketing’s Rapid Growth and Popularity with
Major Corporations Frustrates the Protection of
Consumers
Undercover marketing is no longer a grassroots practice.189
Large, big-budget corporations, such as Microsoft, Kellogg, BMW,
Apple, and Cadbury Schweppes PLC, are putting their advertising
dollars into undercover marketing campaigns.190 Further, Big Fat
Promotions Inc.’s profits increased fivefold in the first two years of
the company’s existence.191 Clearly, undercover marketing is no
longer a niche endeavor; however, one would be hard pressed to
compile reliable estimates of corporate spending on undercover
marketing, in part because companies resist admitting that they use
stealth methods.192 Presumably, the more money spent on
undercover marketing campaigns, the more consumers will be
subjected to polished schemes, inevitably leading to widespread
deception.193 Consumers are not the only ones falling prey to
undercover marketers. Business owners frequently have no idea
that their establishments are being used by undercover marketing
operatives to push products; further, they are given no
compensation in exchange for the use of their venues.194 As
undercover marketers secretly pour greater amounts of money into
189

John Arlidge, The Way We Live Now: Too Good to be True, THE
OBSERVER (London Edition), Aug. 12, 2001, at 6; Vranica, supra note 79.
190
Arlidge, supra note 189; Vranica, supra note 79.
191
Morgan Campbell, You Won’t Feel a Thing, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 7,
2001, at D01.
192
Eisenberg, supra note 80.
193
Id. (explaining that “industry experts say that outlays for alternative
campaigns are growing rapidly–and that Madison Avenue has little choice but to
seek new ways to push products”).
194
Jane Standley, Undercover Advertising Targets Consumers, BBC NEWS,
August 17, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/ 1496213.stm
(explaining that “the conversations struck up or the recommendations you
overhear are selling not just talking and sometimes even the business owner
doesn’t even know what is going on”).
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more elaborate campaigns, they will soon have both unwitting
consumers and business owners literally eating, drinking, and
snapping photos out of their proverbial hands.
C. Consumer Backlash: An Inevitable Consequence of
Undercover Marketing in a Time of Tarnished
Corporate Credibility
Despite some undercover marketers’ hopeful outlook for the
potential of undercover campaigns, as undercover marketing
tactics are revealed to the general public, marketers run the risk of
even further tarnishing corporate credibility in this age of corporate
scandal.195 The FTC might determine that it is in the best interest
of society and a well-functioning marketplace to preempt the
spread of distrust that may balloon as undercover marketing tactics
come to light.196 The fact that successful advertising industry
leaders themselves have decried the tactics of undercover
marketers should make clear to the FTC that undercover marketing
is not only a questionable practice, but also a dangerous one for
corporate goodwill.197 Some in the industry warn that backlash
195

Ritter, supra note 89 (arguing that undercover marketing could be bad
for business overall, in that if advertising techniques become so deceptive,
corporate credibility could take a hit and result in an overriding state of distrust
of companies).
196
See Harmon Leon, Secret Agents of Capitalism: Is That Hottie Really
Flirting With You, or Is It Undercover Marketing?, METROACTIVE, May 12,
2004, at http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/05.12.04/marketing-0420.
html (imagining an “Orwellian . . . paranoid environment” resulting from
undercover marketing, where interactions with others are made to be
questioned).
197
Vranica, supra note 79 (quoting David Lubars, president and creative
director at Fallon Worldwide, a prominent advertising agency, who cautioned
that marketers should be honest with customers in order to avoid a backlash in
the future once undercover marketing strategies come to light). See also
Eisenberg, supra note 80 (quoting Keith Reinhard, chairman of DDB
Worldwide advertising agency, criticizing undercover marketing as “bad
business”); Walking, Talking Stealth Ads, supra note 7 (quoting Scott Marticke,
managing director of Atlanta’s Titan Advertising, who decried undercover
marketing, saying, “[a]s it goes on, it will create a kind of disconnect, and
people won’t know whom to trust”).
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should be a real concern of undercover marketers.198 However,
judging by the burgeoning number of corporations employing
undercover marketers and the money being spent on these
campaigns, it does not appear that advertisers are taking such
warnings to heart.199
A 2004 Marketing and Ethics News Poll conducted by CMO
Magazine, a publication for chief marketing officers, indicates that
marketing executives worry about the effects of unethical practices
in business, especially in light of the recent scandals involving
Enron and Martha Stewart.200 Seventy-three percent of those
polled believe that increasing penalties for offenders is the best
way to deter future unethical practices.201 The marketing
executives also stated that deceptive sales and marketing practices
were the top ethical issue facing their industry today, followed
closely by dishonesty with customers.202 Furthermore, those polled
viewed deceptive marketing practices as one of the top three

198

See, e.g., 60 Minutes, supra note 7 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell, author
of THE TIPPING POINT). Of undercover marketing, Gladwell warned:
My problem with undercover marketing is not what happens in the
moment. It’s what happens in a week, or two weeks, or a month down
the road, when we discover we’ve been duped. And I think that the
moment when we discover we’ve been duped causes a backlash.
Companies who engage in this practice are courting that backlash. And
that’s a very, very dangerous thing to play with.
Id. See, e.g., Rogier van Bakel, A Letter From the Editor: Big Fat Liars,
ADVERTISING AGE’S CREATIVITY, Aug. 1, 2001, at 6. Van Bakel, editor of
Advertising Age’s Creativity, warns that “[u]nlike flavored water poured over
vodka, credibility and deceit never mix. You can’t build a brand without first
building trust, and the fastest way to squander trust is to play people for
suckers. . . .” Id.
199
See supra Part IV.B (discussing the rapid growth of corporate budgets
for undercover marketing campaigns).
200
IDG’s CMO Magazine Reports the Untold Challenges, Evolving
Pressures that Chief Marketing Officers Face, PRIMEZONE MEDIA NETWORK,
Aug. 30, 2004, available at 2004 WL 91766902.
201
CMO Marketing and Ethics News Poll, available at http://www.
cmomagazine.com/ethics_poll/.
202
Id. at 5. See, e.g., Vranica, supra note 79 (quoting a marketing executive
who characterized undercover marketing as “reprehensible” and “desperate”).
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ethical issues facing U.S. businesses generally.203 Perhaps this is
because 44.6 percent of those polled admitted that they had
witnessed someone in their company engage in or develop
deceptive or misleading sales or promotion tactics.204 These
numbers are telling. Marketing executives recognize that deceptive
marketing practices pose a disturbing ethical dilemma and concede
that regulatory enforcement and penalties would effectively deter
such conduct.205 The FTC should take advantage of this corporate
attitude by enacting regulations to rein in the use of these troubling
and deceptive practices.
D. Undercover Marketing Breeds an Atmosphere of Distrust
and Skepticism
Undercover marketing adds a new twist to advertising.
Although traditional advertising makes use of persuasion or charm,
it does not typically involve explicit trickery.206 Undercover
marketers flagrantly deceive consumers, and they are not shy about
it.207 One undercover marketer told the New York Times Magazine
that his goal for each mission was simple: to subtly impart the
sponsor’s message to consumers and “implant things about the
product into their head.”208 One scholar argues that undercover
marketing is distinguishable from most other types of advertising
because it is based in artificiality.209 Consumers expect
203

CMO Marketing and Ethics News Poll, supra note 201.
Id.
205
Id.
206
Yvonne Cartwright, Undercover Marketing: Pitching You on the Sly,
BELLINGHAM BUSINESS JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 2003, at B13 (discussing the opinion
advanced by Malcolm Gladwell, author of THE TIPPING POINT, that undercover
marketing is a bit of a con game). Gladwell’s statement highlights the point that
traditional advertising tries to coax customers towards a certain product, while
undercover marketing tries to hoodwink them. Id.
207
Undercover Agencies, supra note 16 (quoting Jonathan Ressler, founder
of Big Fat Promotions, Inc., who boasted that his operatives will never reveal
their true agendas).
208
Rutenberg, supra note 86.
209
Thomas Nord, Stealth Marketing – Is it the Next Big Thing or Just a Big
Fat Flop?, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Aug. 3, 2001, at 1C (quoting a professor of
204
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commercials on television, but not in their local bars and hangouts.
Companies such as Big Fat Promotions, Inc. and Interference, Inc.
intentionally situate endorsers in places where people’s guards are
down.210
Jonathan Ressler of Big Fat Promotions, Inc. attempts to
defend his practices by stating that the operatives are telling the
truth about the positive attributes of the products they are
promoting.211 However, courts have held that truthfulness within
marketing will not save a message that is misleading overall.212
Although the FTC mandates that endorsers reveal their connections
to sponsor companies, undercover marketers avoid doing so at all
costs.213 So long as the FTC continues to turn a blind eye to these
deceptive practices, people may eventually become increasingly
skeptical of one another’s motives. They may begin to ask
themselves, “does this girl really want to have a drink with me or is
she being paid by the gin company?” or “does my neighbor really
prefer that brand of detergent or has she been hired to chat me up
about it?” Undercover marketing creates a “sort of Truman Show
situation where the world is full of ‘real people’ acting as your best
mates when, in fact, they are paid brand spokesmen.”214 Such a
state of distrust cannot be in the public’s best interest, which the

marketing at Indiana’s Kelley School of Business).
210
Id.
211
BAKAN, supra note 15, at 134 (explaining that Ressler is proud of his
commitment to honesty in telling the truth about the products). See also
Campbell, supra note 191 (quoting John Palumbo, chief strategy officer at Big
Fat Promotions, Inc., who said that the practice is honest because the company
only sends out operatives who use the products being hocked).
212
Bockenstette, 134 F.2d at 371 (explaining that “words and sentences
may be literally and technically true and yet be framed in such a setting as to
mislead or deceive”).
213
FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5; Campbell, supra note 191
(quoting Jonathan Ressler of Big Fat Promotions, Inc., who explained that the
company will not reveal its clients’ names). Ressler explained, “by naming them
we render the whole promotion useless. The key here is confidentiality.” Id.
214
Arlidge, supra note 189 (quoting Sean Pillot de Chenecey, a trends
forecasting consultant who works for Saatchi & Saatchi, Weiden & Kennedy,
and McCann Erickson).
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FTC is empowered to promote.215 Kalle Lasn, the editor of
Adbusters magazine, lamented the potential effect of undercover
marketing on communities as a whole. She explained, “It is a form
of cultural corruption at a time when advertising already pervades
the landscape. It’s much more insidious because marketers are
creating culture at the grassroots level, on the streets and where we
live.”216
Even children are being exploited by undercover marketers.
Hasbro, a leading children’s toy company, recently recruited 1,600
boys from Chicago, Illinois, ages eight to ten, and paid them to
play a new handheld video game called “Pox” and to tell their
friends about it.217 Sales of the game skyrocketed and Hasbro spent
a fraction of what it would have on a traditional advertising
campaign.218 Undercover marketing is invading the playground,
the local watering hole, Times Square, and the laundromat, and can
easily spread anywhere. In its Policy Statement, the FTC warned
that the Commission “intends to enforce the FTC Act
vigorously . . . [and] will investigate, and prosecute where
appropriate, acts or practices that are deceptive.”219 The FTC must
wholeheartedly combat undercover marketing if it truly intends to
investigate and prosecute deceptive acts.
CONCLUSION
Although undercover marketing is unconventional and
somewhat enigmatic,220 the FTC retains the power to continually
215

15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1938) (empowering the FTC to initiate proceedings
against individuals and companies using any unfair or deceptive practice in or
affecting commerce if such proceeding is in the public interest).
216
McBeth, supra note 139 (noting the observation of some critics that
undercover marketing is sinister in nature).
217
Id. (outlining the Hasbro campaign).
218
Id.
219
FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39.
220
As compared to a television commercial, for example. While
undercover marketing can take many forms in many different locales,
commercial advertising is considerably standard. Television commercials do not
command consumer interaction, while undercover marketers seek to engage
consumers both physically and verbally.
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expand its focus to keep pace with the evolution of the marketplace
and to develop new enforcement priorities as times change.221 The
FTC should heed the charge of Judge Learned Hand, who observed
that the FTC’s duty is to “discover and make explicit those
unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience of the
community may progressively develop.”222 FTC investigations
often serve as a vital means of gathering information for the
issuance of new FTC policy statements or industry guides.223
Therefore, even if the FTC is unsure at this stage whether
undercover marketing practices demand individual prosecutions,
the agency still can be proactive by providing undercover
marketers with specific guidance as to the permissible bounds of
their practices and by alerting them to the imposition of a more
regulatory stance in the future.224 As illustrated by the Sony
example, undercover marketing encapsulates all of the FTC criteria
for deceptive practices and, as such, should be addressed by the
FTC. However the FTC sees fit to best serve the public interest, it
must act now before undercover marketing becomes so seamless
that it is completely undetectable.

221

All-State Industries of North Carolina, Inc., 75 F.T.C. 465 (noting the
expectation that the FTC will continually adapt its regulations to changing
competitive systems).
222
FTC v. Standard Education Society, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936),
rev’d on other grounds, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
223
FTC Operating Manual, supra note 30, at ch. 3.1.3.4.
224
Id. at ch. 8.3.3 (explaining that the FTC may issue an industry guide to
address a specific practice in lieu of taking individualized enforcement action if
such a guide might spur companies to proactively curb the practice in order to
avoid FTC prosecution). However, the Operating Manual does caution that an
industry guide would be inappropriate if there are indications that the violations
are willful or wanton or if compliance with the standard of lawful conduct is
unlikely to be attained without an enforcement action or creation of a
substantive rule having binding effect. Id. at ch. 8.3.4. While an industry guide
on undercover marketing may indicate in black and white that undercover
marketing contravenes the FTC Act and the FTC Guides, undercover marketers
seem intent on doing exactly what the FTC Guides prohibit, namely, refusing to
disclose material connections between companies and endorsers. FTC Guides,
supra note 3, at §255.5. Therefore, an industry guide may do little more than put
a name to a practice that the FTC Act already prohibits.

